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Schocken Books, the German-Jewish publishing house that employed Hannah Arendt as 
an editor in New York during the 1940s, has released a new collection of Arendt’s work 
entitled The Jewish Writings, an extraordinary assembly of occasional pieces, essays, 
editorials, book reviews, and letters that document Arendt’s ongoing engagement with 
Jews and Judaism, beginning with her reflections and analyses of anti-Semitism in the 
1930s, moving to the war and post-war years and the foundation of Israel in the 1940s 
and 50s, and concluding with the Eichmann controversy in the 1960s. Opening essays by 
Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman and a concluding memoir by Arendt’s niece, Edna 
Brocke, offer biographical and intellectual backgrounds and contexts. As the pieces 
unfold year by year and sometimes week by week, we witness the drama of Jewish 
statelessness, Holocaust, nation-formation, and their consequences for American, 
European and world thought and politics as they devolved for one of the twentieth 
century’s most engaged, opinionated, and original intellectuals. Some of the interest of 
the volume stems from the uncanny glimpses of history in formation; when Arendt 
refers to “Palestinian terrorist organizations” in 1944, she is speaking, of course, about 
right wing Zionist groups such as Irgun, not about the intifada, and when she writes in 
1938 that the Soviet Union is “the only country where the civil rights of Jews are 
guaranteed by law” (51), we know that she must not yet know of Stalin’s purges.  
The deeper excitement of the book lies in recognizing the relationship between 
these often occasional pieces and the works that would establish Arendt as a major 
interlocutor on the nature of politics. An early draft on “Antisemitism” from 1937/38, 
translated and published for the first time in this volume, provides the arguments and 
insights of The Origins of Totalitarianism.  The classic essays “We Refugees” and “The Jew 
as Pariah,” previously collected by Ron Feldman in The Jew as Pariah (NY: Grove, 1978), 
are now republished alongside pieces contemporary to them from Aufbau, a newspaper 
for German-Jewish expatriates published in New York during the war years. Arendt’s 
drive throughout these pages to define a Jewish politics (rather than a Jewish religion, 
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ethnicity, identity, or culture) discloses the existential source of her deep commitment 
elsewhere to distinguish absolutely the political from the social.  
At the head of the collection stands an intense little piece entitled “The 
Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,” an essay in intellectual history from 1932 that 
establishes many of the key concerns of the more journalistic and editorial pieces that 
follow.  Arendt begins by reflecting on the specifically Enlightenment project of Jewish 
emancipation, and then turns to the historicism of Johann Gottfried von Herder, who 
affirmed the content and texture of Jewish life in its particularity, apart from any 
rationality it might manifest in itself or for Christianity. Herder directly links this 
reappropriated significance to the status of the Jews as a people, seeding the national 
element in German historicism: “He does not concede to them their sameness with 
other peoples—which for the Enlightenment is the only means of making them human 
beings – but instead emphasizes their foreignness” (13). Herder restores historicity to 
the Jews, but deprives that history of its content by canceling its theological foundations: 
“Thus the Jews have become a people without a history within history. Herder’s 
understanding of history deprives them of their past. Once again they stand face to face 
with nothing” (16). The Jews, newly rationalized by the Enlightenment and then 
historicized by its Romantic turn, find themselves at sea in a fundamental 
groundlessness: “In their struggle for emancipation they are forced continually to 
perform a salto mortali, to attempt a leap into their own integration” (16).  
In the Enlightenment essay, Arendt notes the identification of the Jews with “a 
position of exceptionality” (16), at once inside European history as part of its typological 
architecture and economic machinery, yet cordoned off from it by the operations of 
civil and religious law. The problem of the political exception, which has become such an 
urgent theme in contemporary discussions of the war on terror, recurs throughout The 
Jewish Writings. In the long draft on “Antisemitism,” Arendt argues that political 
exceptionality has repeatedly marked the condition of the Jews as a group integrated 
economically but excluded politically from the nation-states that house them. Since 
emancipation conferred citizenship as a privilege rather than acknowledged it as a right, 
citizenship could be, and often was, revoked by the same nation-states that had granted 
it. Moreover, emancipation was often extended only to wealthy Jews, whose capital and 
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services benefited the state, deepening the divide between the bourgeois citizen-Jews 
invited into assimilation and the poor Eastern Jews who remained locked in shtetl 
culture, taking exception to modernity. Whereas emancipation appeared to incorporate 
the Jews as citizens into the modern nation-states of Western Europe, its selective 
mechanisms actually maintained the Jews in a suspended state of emergency, as became 
disastrously clear with the passage of the Nuremberg Laws, whose “laws of exception” 
(31) revoked Jewish citizenship in 1935. 
The tension between emancipation and exception—between integration into 
European society and a continued distance from it—remains a constant theme 
throughout The Jewish Writings. Although Arendt associates assimilation with the 
insecurity and opportunism of the parvenu, she also acknowledges that a degree of 
assimilation necessarily attends the process of Enlightenment, whose rezoning of Jewish 
intellectual possibilities in modernity are reflected and advanced in Arendt’s own life and 
work. She titles an early essay on the Jewish salon hostess Rahel Varnhagen (1771-1833) 
“Original Assimilation,” a phrase that grasps the virtuosity of Varnhagen’s love affair with 
European culture. Choosing a Biblical figure to capture the shallow brilliance of 
Varnhagen’s assimilationist intellect, Arendt compares Rahel to Adam: “Purely 
independent, because born into no cultural world, without prejudice, because it seemed 
no one judged before her, as if in the paradoxical situation of the first human being, she 
was compelled to appropriate everything as if she were meeting it for the first time” 
(25). Varnhagen’s assimilation is “original” because it flows out of and gives shape to the 
very moment of historicized Enlightenment grasped with such poetic exactitude by 
Herder. Disengaged from tradition, “dependent on unprecedence” (25), Varnhagen is 
left with the subjective orientation of “experience,” the egoistic and ultimately “vacant” 
matter of “her own life,” as her only ingress into “an alien history” (26). Although critics 
have often seen in Arendt’s biographical musings on Varnhagen elements of 
identification (the charismatic intelligence, the sexual venturing, the intermarriage), 
Arendt clearly distinguishes her own insistence on the power of precedence, both 
Greek and Jewish, from Varnhagen’s experiential romanticism. If Rahel is Adamic in her 
desperate innocence, Hannah resembles Jeremiah in her prophetic pursuit of a new 
covenant, a berit hadashah that might reconnect the Jews to each other in a politics that 
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would take shape through and beyond the catastrophes of exile and the casualties of 
forgetfulness. 
At various points in the collection, we watch Arendt attempting to fill the vacancy 
created by the Varnhagens of German Jewry without renewing Judaism through religious 
practice. In a fascinating short piece from 1932 entitled “Against Private Circles,” Arendt 
argues for the need to develop Jewish grammar schools for the children of an 
increasingly disenfranchised German Jewry:  
The coming generation must know the history of Jewish assimilation and of 
antisemitism as well as it knows the history of Judaism up until 
assimilation. Only in this way can they be provided with a basis from 
which to judge their environment and themselves in a genuinely 
reasonable way; only in this way can they lend substance to a self-
consciousness which as a merely ethical command must always remain 
vacant. (20) 
Arendt diagnoses the vacancy embraced by Varnhagen as the general condition of 
assimilated German Jewry, and she tries to craft a positive pedagogy, based on history 
and reason, that would provide content and structure for increasingly besieged and 
bewildered secular Jews. Recalling aspects of the Tarbut or “culture” schools, a network 
of secular, Hebrew-language schools in Eastern Europe, the education she envisions is 
political not only in terms of the materials Arendt hopes to deliver (something like The 
Origins of Totalitarianism for Children), but also in the public rather than private space of 
instruction, a true community day school that would bring together the alien sectors of 
the Jewish population for collective study of the conditions that have led to both their 
internal divisions and their escalating exclusion from German life. How long such a 
pedagogy could survive disconnected from religious education, however, remains 
questionable; the Tarbut schools of Eastern Europe have now become, in at least one 
American instance, Tarbut v’Torah, culture and law.i  
Arendt’s most consistent tack in the search to reground modern Jewry in a content 
other than religion or experience is the idea of the Jews as a “people.” She writes from 
New York in 1941, “we do have the right to be a ‘people like all peoples’ and human 
beings among our fellow human beings” (161). In a recurrent topic of her wartime 
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editorials, Arendt argues that the Jews should be allowed to fight under their own flag, 
to go to war as Jews and not simply as soldiers of the British Army. A Jewish army 
would grant the Jews the dignity of confronting their enemies, rather than relegating 
them to the passive status of victims, refugees, and recipients of aid. Some of Arendt’s 
reasoning here bears comparison with Carl Schmitt’s account of the fundamental 
transformation of the structure of hostility in the “total wars” of the twentieth century; 
indeed, Arendt gives Schmitt a less than damning footnote in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.  
To be “a people like all peoples,” a phrase borrowed from Zionist discourse, 
establishes the Jews not as a religion but as a nation; Arendt uses the phrase in order to 
reject the gentrification of Judaism into a faith by the Reform movement and to 
revitalize the political core of the Jewish tradition at risk of destruction by assimilationist 
tendencies (149-50). By placing Jewish peoplehood within the “communal life of nations” 
and the “history of humankind,” however, Arendt flags her discomfort with the nation-
state solution increasingly championed by the main wing of Zionism. As Judith Butler has 
argued in her review of The Jewish Writings, Arendt in these pieces is seeking “an idea of 
the ‘nation’ that is uncoupled from both statehood and territory.” ii Such a project 
resounds in Arendt’s support of federations of national groups that would participate in 
collective decision-making, whether in a new European union or in a Mediterranean 
federation that would link Jewish settlements in Israel with both Arab and non-Arab 
groups in the region. 
Missing from Arendt’s account of the Jews as a people is an account of its covenantal 
foundations in the Hebrew Bible, where God recommits to all creation after the Flood 
(Gen 6), promises nationhood to Abraham in the covenant of circumcision (Gen 17), 
and finally constitutes Israel as a goy kadosh, a holy nation, with the giving of the law at 
Sinai (Ex 19:6). There are, I think, two reasons for the absence of a covenantal 
vocabulary in The Jewish Writings, one taking its bearings from within Arendt’s political 
thinking, and the other reflecting the limited terms of her own covenant with Judaism. 
Arendt’s mature political writings, as crystallized in The Human Condition (1958), take 
human action, not law, as the essence of politics; covenant and contract have no real 
place in her genealogy of politics, since they already signal the absorption of genuine 
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politics into the economic negotiations of the merely social. Meanwhile, from within 
Judaism, covenant signified religious observance and an historical particularism at odds 
with the rational universe of philosophy; covenant would have seemed too redolent of 
orthodoxy to appear politically useful to Arendt and her circle. 
Both the marked absence and the residual pull of covenantal thinking make 
themselves felt in Arendt’s open letter to Gershom Scholem of 1963: “To be a Jew 
belongs for me to the indisputable facts of my life … There is such a thing as a basic 
gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and not made; for what is 
physei and not nom” (466). Judith Butler comments in a constructionist direction: “Is 
there not a making of what is given that complicates the apparent distinction between 
physei and nom ?”   I would suggest somewhat differently that Arendt chooses physis, 
nature, as the last grounds that the secularization of Judaism leaves behind when it has 
evacuated nomos, law, of its ongoing validity. Physis, like her concept of peoplehood, 
echoes ethnicity as a genetic heritage, evokes certain forms of textual reasoning, 
remains reconcilable with Enlightenment, and stands apart from religious practice or 
belief. Such a physis attempts to materialize and render positive the gap created by 
Herder’s historicism and Varnhagen’s vacancy. By evoking “gratitude,” an aspect of hesed 
or covenant-love, in relation to the givenness of physis, Arendt suggests something like a 
post-covenantal relationship with the God of the Jews, a reappropriation of Judaism that 
occurs not simply at the subjectivizing level of understanding (as Herder describes the 
dialectic of Jewish Bildung), but through a more existential acknowledgement of a 
creative debt that precedes the subject and cannot be fully cognized by her.iii Arendt’s 
declaration of gratitude for Jewishness as something which for her simply and 
incontrovertibly is reaches beyond a nativist nationalism in order to grasp at the 
extraordinary inscribed givenness of Judaism as a set of writings, rites, and memories – 
of observations and observances—oriented around the legislative speech-act of 
covenant in its several instances and destinies. Such an acknowledgment, however, never 
crystallizes into a positive program; Arendt remains, like Herder’s Jews, “face to face 
with nothing,” ever attempting that salto mortali into integration with the community of 
nations from a fundamental groundlessness that remains the hallmark of her Jewish 
generation. 
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In The Jewish Writings, Arendt struggles to articulate a relationship to Judaism that is 
neither assimilationist nor separatist, a settlement that would allow Jews to participate 
in Western political forms, but without either giving up their status as Jews, validating 
that status through religious observance, or embracing the nation-state as the essential 
form that politics must take. Although some readers may, like me, be left unsatisfied by 
the indeterminacy of Arendt’s account of Judaism, The Jewish Writings are uniquely 
revelatory of the ambiguities and achievements of Judaism in modernity. Moreover, 
Arendt’s habitation of a conceptual circuit distinct from the cultural and materialist ones 
that have guided so much literary study in recent years may suggest new directions for 
conceptualizing the Jewish presence in Western and world traditions—including those, 
like covenant, that Arendt herself falls short of developing. 
 
                                                
i Tarbut v’Torah Community Day School, Irvine, California. 
ii Judith Butler, Review of Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, London Review of Books 10 May 2007: 26. For 
Arendt’s federative proposals, see “Can the Jewish-Arab Question be Solved?”, The Jewish Writings, 193-
98. 
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relationship.” Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions (New Brunswick: 
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